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Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, in the evolution of a legal and
social system during the stormy period of the feudal ages, devel-
oped the common law, and they looked upon it and called it good;
and Lord Coke, than whom none was greater of his kind, declared
this common law to be " the perfection of human reason ;" and
so it has been revered and almost worshiped by succeeding gen-
erations of lawyers, English and American.
Having thus constructed this wonderful system of common law,
the very "perfection of human reason," the English people then
set about to develop a system of equity for "the correction of that
wherein the law was deficient," as Mr. Justice Blackstone assures
us.
Thus, these two systems, the one perfect, and the other cor-
recting its imperfections, grew up together side by side in English
jurisprudence and together formed the fullness of that legal sys-
tem which our ancestors brought with them in their very persons
to America.
It was natural that from such an incongruous beginning there
should be developed in the various colonies interesting and
amusing legal anomalies; and although the various colonies all
derived their laws from the same source, it is not strange that
under different local conditions were developed different systems
of practice and different views of the common law and the cor-
recting system of equity. Most of them believed, with old Selden,
that equity was "a roguish thing;" that there was no rule or
standard for its application more certain than the "length of the
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Chancellor's foot," and that, therefore, it ought to be kept
"beyond the seas," lest it might be employed as an engine of
oppression and an instrument of tyranny; and so, for a long time
the stem rigor of the common law registered its harsh judg-
ments, and its special instances of gross injustice, without the
mollifying influence of equity. But with the growth of civiliza-
tion and the accumulation of property our ancestors began to
realize that the system of equity was as much their birth-right as
that of common law; that as Englishmen they were entitled to
demand that the harshness of the common law, born of the sever-
ities of the feudal system and ministering to the tyranny of the
feudal lords, should be softened by the geherous rules and chris-
tianizing influence of equity. In the fullness of time in each of
the colonies were established tribunals for the administration of
equity differing in character, constitution and /ersonnd, but all
having the common purpose of administering justice ex &quo et bono
in such matters as were not remedied by the common law. It is
true their jurisdiction and terms were uncertain and varying; and
as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, it was said that
there was "no court in chancery in the Charter Governments of
New England, nor any court vested with power to determine
cases in equity save only on mortgages, bonds and other penalties
contained in deeds ;" still, in most of the colonies, in some way
or another, when the exigency arose, demanding the interposition
of equity, there was discovered to be some tribunal which had
some authority to grant relief. In some of the colonies the gov-
ernors alone acted as courts of equity ; in others they acted with
their councils ; in yet others the Legislature, usually by a Com-
mittee ; in others equity judges were appointed, and in yet others
the courts of law took cognizance of equitable subjects.
This confusion of courts and of procedure in matters of equity
continued till the beginning of this century, when the joint labors
of Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story began: to bring order
out of chaos. But still their labors resulted only in establishing
substantive equity; procedure remained as incongruous as before;
and in the very State to which the labors and learning of Chancellor
Kent had given distinction and superiority in jurisprudence, was
first adopted the Code of Mr. David Dudley Field, the primary
effect, if not purpose, of which was to obliterate the distinctions
between law and equity, to dispense with separate courts for the
administration of these two systems of law and equity, and to
homologate the single system of law and practice. Many other
States adopted the Code system; some adhered to the Federal
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system in which the courts have jurisdiction of " all cases in law
and equity" and yet maintained the distinctions of pleading and
procedure existing in England at the time of the Revolution;
while a third class maintained their separate courts of law and
equity. Thus has grown up in the United States three different
systems of procedure with some corresponding differences in sub-
stantive law.
In the list of Code States will be found, besides New York, the
two Carolinas, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Nevada, California,
Oregon and the covey of new States recently admitted. To the
old system of separate tribunals belong the States of New Jersey,
Delaware, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi-and Maryland, Vir-
ginia and Kentucky have Chancery Courts in their principal cities.
To the intermediate class, represented by the Federal Courts, may
be assigned the six New England States and Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, the two Virginias, Georgia, Florida, Michigan, Illinois
and Texas; while Louisana seems to maintain a system sui juris,
built upon the Code Napoleon.
The practice of the Federal Courts as courts of equity is
uniform throughout the United States, the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon it, having ordained that in
all particulars not specially regulated by rule or statute, the prac-
tice of the Circuit Court shall be regulated by the "Practice of
the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may
reasonably be applied consistently with the circumstances of local
convenience of the district where the court is held;" while by
statute, the practice, pleadings and procedure in law causes in
the Federal Courts are required "to conform as near as may be to
the practice, pleadings and procedure in the Courts of the State
where the Federal Court is held." Thus exists not only great
variety of procedure in the several State courts, but an equally
great diversity of the law side of the Federal Courts; aud the
course of practice throughout the United States, instead of being
a broad national high-way, is a tortuous path over mountain,
brake and fen, and on through forest, savanna, prairie and
desert into a hopeless cul de sac.
The inherent difficulties arising from these different systems
of practice is often greatly increased by the attempt of one State
to adapt a Code of Procedure prepared for an entirely different
social and business condition, omitting the "as near as- may be"
qualification of the Uniform Practice Act above referred to.
Illustration of this was to be found in North Carolina about x88o,
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and possibly still exists there. During the period of Reconstruc-
tion, by the negroes of the State with the aid of Northern lead-
ers who were there on the "fool's errand" of trying to make the
fence stand with the bottom rail on top, the legal practice of the
State was reconstructed by the adoption of the New York Code of
Civil Procedure, with all its penalties and high-pressure
machinery adapted to the conditions of an alert, eager, pushing
commercial community. Rip Van Winkle himself was not more
surprised on returning to his native village after his long sleep
than were the lawyers of the old "Tar-heel State," in finding the
smooth, easy paths of practice of a sleepy agricultural community
roughly torn up by the plow-share of this new-fangled commercial
machine. It was as well adapted to their condition as were the
light driving buggies of the Riverside Park to the rough roads of
the Black mountains, or the garb of the Broadway dandy to the
turpentine stiller on the Big Tar river-no better; and North
Carolina had about as much use for the system as she had for a
clearing-house, a Central Park or a Stock Exchange. The
clamors of the bar soon brought about an amendment which was
effected by repealing the stringent requirements and the penalties
of the Code, and left it a great heavy cumbrous piece of
machinery without driving-wheels, steam-chest or boiler, pro-
pelled alone by the typical slow ox-team.
Similar incongruities have resulted, no doubt, from the hasty
adoption of the New York Code in some of the Western States,
but none probably more striking than this where the slowest of
the original States was expected to keep pace with the swiftest.
It was a "pace that killed;" and it will doubtless require a gen-
eration to adjust the bar to the practice, or the practice to the
bar.
Tennessee presents just now a remarkable instance of incon-
gruities in a State where the double system prevails, resulting from
the urgent demand for reform and the lack of Legislative compre-
hension of this dual system. It was the boast of the old common
law that it preserved inviolate the right of trial by jury, whereas
the twelve were never allowed to sit in the High Court of Chancery.
It was further peculiar to the law court that all witnesses were
examined in the presence of a jury while the slow method of pre-
senting proof in the Chancery was by deposition. There was also
a well marked line of jurisdiction for the courts of equity embrac-
ing cases of fraud, accident, misconduct and trusts, which matters
were generally excluded from the jurisdiction of courts of law.
Such was the system and practice in Tennessee half a century ago.
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Recent legislation while recognizing and preserving the
separate system of courts, has so confused and confounded their
practice and jurisdiction as to make them scarcely recognizable by
their best friends. Gradually, during the past forty years, equit-
able defenses of various kinds have been admitted at law, so that
not only could the consideration of a sealed instrument be inquired
into, but a deed could be converted by parol proof into a mortgage
according to the very fact and right of the case. At the same
time the Chancery Court has been given jurisdiction of all civil
causes except "injuries to person, property or character involving
unliquidated damages." Thus is law in all matters of contract to
be administered according to equity.
And in the matter of evidence, the change is as great as in that
of jurisdiction. The deposition of any witness may be taken in
any civil cause in a court of law merely upon notice to the opposite
party, whether the witness be resident or non-resident, while in a
chancery court witnesses may be introduced and examined orally
in divorce cases and in all jury trials.
But the key-stone was laid in this arch of confusion when either
party on peremptory demand was given to a jury to try any issue
of fact arising in any cause in chancery, which demand might
be made at any time, up to the very moment of trial, wbile in the
courts of law a party was held conclusively to have waived his
right to a jury unless he should formally make demand therefor
in his first pleading tendering an issue. Thus, jury trials instead
of being preserved inviolate in courts of law, were practically
denied in a majority of cases, while in chancery they were to be
had merely for the asking. Depositions became as common in
courts of law as oral prcof, and a term of the chancery court rarely
passed without witnesses being examined orally in it. The Chan-
cellor was constantly construing legal contracts, and giving judg-
ments, and awarding execution for the collection of debt, and
administering other "weightier matters of the law," while the
courts of law are inquiring into accident, misconduct and fraud,
and other questions of equity and good conscience. Moreover, the
courts of law are authorized to issue writs of injunction, appoint
receivers and execute their judgments by any appropriate final
process which may be formulated pro hac vice, while the court of
chancery issues writs of mandamus and supersedeas, and more com-
mon than all, fAerifacias. And yet, there is not probably a State
in the Union where law is administered more zealously with an
eye single to the attainment of justice than in Tennessee.
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These anomalies of practice will, no doubt, continue as long as
the present dual system lasts. The beginning of the next century
will probably find Tennessee in the list of those States which
administer justice according to the forms observed in the Federal
Courts, having a single system of courts, administering matters of
law according to legal forms, and matters of equity according to
the forms of courts of chancery. Then, amidst the "wilderness
of single instances" and following "the codeless myriad of prece-
dent," we shall no longer use the "lawless science of the law,"
but shall travel along the great highway of consistency and reason
to ultimate right and justice.
